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This article, which forms part of the ‘New Voices’ series and is hence drafted as an essay 
rather than a proper academic article, examines the principle of subsidiarity in its 
application to local and regional authorities as they exist within the various Member 
States. While subnational authorities (‘SNAs’) have been studied extensively within the 
respective domestic contexts, their relation with other levels of public authority, such as the 
European Union, is less well-defined. Subsidiarity is often cast as the principle capable of 
recognising the existence of subnational autonomies by the EU, and guiding their interaction 
with the latter. This is so in particular after Article 5(3) TEU has been amended on the 
occasion of the Lisbon Treaty revision to include an express reference to local and regional 
authorities. This short essay challenges this perception of subsidiarity, putting forward that 
the core legal provisions that deal with subsidiarity in EU law do not allocate any 
meaningful role for SNAs. This is so, it is argued, because subsidiarity remains anchored in 
an understanding of the European Union and its legal order as composed of and shaped by 
the EU and the Member States to the exclusion of any other actor. 
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The existence of local and regional authorities, which frequently have the 
competence to issue regulation, in the different Member States of the 
European Union is a factual truth. We know that they exist, and co-regulate 
with other levels of public authority, such as the Member States and the 
European Union. In this context the quest for a principle to guide the 
interaction between these multiple centres at which public authority is 
exercised appears to be a practical necessity. Subsidiarity is often cast as the 
principle capable of fulfilling that task in recognising the existence of 
subnational autonomies in the EU. In addition to its pre-legislative function, 
the principle is often presented as embodying a wider significance, a sort of 	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ethos for the coexistence of many centres of public authority, including those 
at subnational level, in the EU. This is so in particular after it has been 
amended on the occasion of the Lisbon Treaty revision to include an express 
reference to local and regional authorities.1 
 
My short essay challenges this perception of subsidiarity. The main argument 
that is developed is that the core legal provisions that deal with subsidiarity in 
EU law do not allocate any meaningful role for subnational authorities 
(‘SNAs’).2 This is so, it is argued, because subsidiarity remains anchored in an 
understanding of the European Union and its legal order as composed of and 
shaped by the EU and the States to the exclusion of any other actor. Thus, 
while subsidiarity bears the promise of recognising SNAs in EU law, it is 
unsuccessful in doing so in practice. The conclusion this essay will accordingly 
reach is that the reformulation of subsidiarity to recognise SNAs is mainly a 
rhetorical twist, which appears incapable of bringing about substantive 
change.  
 
The analysis that leads me to reach this conclusion is structured as follows. I 
will first briefly recall the structure of the European legal order in which 
regulation originates at a multitude of centres of public authority, including 
the local and regional scales. The analysis will then focus on subsidiarity as the 
posterchild of a multi-level EU and illustrate that Article 5(3) TEU was 
specifically designed to recognise the subnational dimension of contemporary 
governance patterns. It will then be seen that despite the promise subsidiarity 
bears in this respect, it is in fact unable to distance itself from the bi-centric 
spirit of EU law. Just as the European Treaties more generally, subsidiarity 
recognises only the Member States and the EU, not local and regional 
authorities, as autonomous regulators. 
 
I. THE EU AS A POLYCENTRIC AND POROUS LEGAL SPACE  
 
The starting point of my observations is that the EU legal order is 
characterised by polycentricity and porosity. The notion of polycentricity 
captures the co-existence of many levels of public authority within the 
complex European legal space. Due to the limited space available to me I will 
not explain this concept in depth, but rather limit myself to providing an 
overview thereof. Polycentricity emphasizes that there are many levels - 
international, supranational, national, regional, local - at which norms are 
created. According to Ostrom ‘Polycentric systems are characterized by 
multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a monocentric 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Art 5(3) TEU. 
2 Such SNAs take have very different statuses, competences and names under the 
domestic provisions of the various EU Member States. For the sake of simplicity they 
will all be generically referred to as SNAs. 
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unit.’3 Within each unit, regulation is issued independently with the advantage 
of using local knowledge. 4 At the same time, however, such regulatory activity 
is fundamentally interdependent as the various units learn from other units 
that ‘are also engaged in trial-and-error learning processes.5 
 
The interaction between various scales of public authority in the EU mirrors 
such simultaneous independence and interdependence. On the one hand, each 
of these units has the capacity to regulate in some domains. On the other 
hand, their norm-generating capacity is limited by the regulatory competence 
of other units and the norms they have already created. Polycentricity thus 
captures that there are many levels of public authority that coexist within the 
EU. It comes accompanied by another phenomenon, that can be labelled as 
porosity, which in turn reflects that the borders dividing these various levels 
of public authority are permeable so that ideas and norms leak from one level 
to another, giving rise to a creative process of cross-fertilization. In the EU 
then, a multitude of levels of public authority interconnect and intertwine and 
their interaction generates a number of legal dynamics. This will not be 
outlined in depth, but an example serves to illustrate my point.  
 
Let’s take Omega, one of those cases known to any student of EU law.6 While 
this decision has often been understood as concerning the relation between a 
national constitutional imperative and EU internal market principles, a closer 
look reveals that Omega can also be understood as an instance of 
polycentricity and porosity in EU law. The German city of Bonn had 
independently decided to ban laser games within its territory; a ban that was 
subsequently challenged for it conflicted with the freedom to provide services 
under Article 56 TFEU. The CJEU however accepted the local ban as 
legitimate because it aimed at the protection of public order and human 
dignity and even declared human dignity to be a general principle of EU law, 
applicable throughout the territory of the EU, thus extending its reach from 
the local to the supranational. A local norm hence coexists with a 
supranational level (polycentricity), conflicts with it, but can nonetheless 
stand and even influence substantive change in EU law (porosity). 
Polycentricity and porosity are of course merely labels that I use because I 
find them helpful in portraying the interaction between various scales in the 
EU. They are more complex in nature than indicated here and some may 
contest that they offer any value at all in describing the EU. That may be true, 
but for the purposes of this essay it should be noted that they reflect a state of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global 
Environmental Change ’ (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 550, 552. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. 
6 Case C-36⁄02 Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin 
der Bundeststadt Bonn [2004] ECR-09609. 
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affairs that subsidiarity seeks to capture, an argument which I outline further 
just below. 
 
It is the subnational dimension of this polycentric legal order that I am 
particularly interested in. SNAs are an intriguing component thereof as they 
doubtlessly exist; yet the European Treaties largely ignore their existence. 
The Treaties engage at length with the relation between the Member States 
and the EU, but not SNAs. The bi-centric spirit of the European Treaties can 
for instance be perceived in the context of the rules on the division of 
competence in the EU, which envisage only the Member States and the EU as 
levels of public authority competent to craft regulation.7 While the existence 
of SNAs cannot be called into question, the Treaties remain predominantly 
bi-centric in nature. Such bi-centricity of course reflects the special status of 
the Member States as masters of the Treaties, which have created the EU and 
continue to determine its shape. In light of the importance of the Member 
States in EU integration, EU law may very well choose to only engage with 
these States and not SNAs - rendering any recognition of SNAs, and the 
search for any mechanism to fulfil that task, unnecessary. This is not, 
however, the route that has been chosen. Two provisions of EU law, namely 
Article 4(2) TEU and Article 5(3) TEU indeed express a clear intention to 
provide some kind of recognition for SNAs in EU law. These two provisions, 
expressly referring to SNAs and the EU’s duty to acknowledge their existence 
cannot be understood in any other way as expressing a willingness to recognise 
subnational autonomies. Whereas the reference to subsidiarity in EU primary 
law did not previously mention SNAs, it was amended in 2009 with the sole 
purpose of including such a reference. Article 5(3) TEU now reads as follows:  
 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 
 
Before the Lisbon Treaty revision subsidiarity existed in EU law, but applied 
only to the Member States and the EU. Its reformulation to include local and 
regional authorities witnesses an intention to recognise these autonomies in 
EU law, even though the exact contours of such recognition remain subject to 
debate.8 The remaining part of this paper examines whether this strategy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Art 3 TFEU, Art 4 TFEU and Art 6 TFEU. 
8 The main questions are whether they are recognized directly or only indirectly through 
the Member State and, if the former is the case, whether they are perceived to have the 
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prone to success. It will undertake an analysis of the ability of subsidiarity to 
recognise local and regional autonomies as components of the polycentric EU 
and reach the conclusion that it is incapable of doing so. The essay will show 
that despite the attempt to move away from bi-centricity the principle 
remains deeply anchored in the bi-centric spirit of the European Treaties. 
 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
Subsidiarity is a pre-legislative procedural requirement that regulates the 
exercise of regulatory competence (rather than its allocation) in the EU.9 In 
areas of non-exclusive EU competence the subsidiarity question unveils 
whether the EU should regulate or not. In addition, the spirit of the 
subsidiarity principle is presumed to operate on a larger scale than just the 
pure pre-legislative setting.10 There is indeed a common assumption that 
subsidiarity more widely symbolises the coexistence of various levels of public 
authority in the EU, making it a catchphrase used to state that European 
integration does not threaten the existence and regulatory competence of 
domestic authorities. It has also been argued that subsidiarity can be 
understood as ‘a way of enhancing pluralism and the diversity of national 
values’.11  
 
It is particularly noteworthy in this regard that subsidiarity is frequently 
presented as the posterchild of a multi-level EU that recognises SNAs. 12  
After all the German Länder played a prominent role behind the insertion of 
the principle into the Maastricht Treaty.13 Subsidiarity has been labelled as ‘a 
principle constitutive of a multilevel governance in Europe’14 as well as an 
‘element connecting the different levels of governance and government and as 
a technique of making flexible the map of competences drawn by the treaties 
or the constitutions.15 Some have put forward that with the entry into force of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
same importance as Member States. I examine this question at length in my doctoral 
thesis and there is no space to reproduce this examination in this essay. 
9 Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, Robert 
Bray (ed) (2nd edn, Sweet&Maxwell 2005), 102.  
10  See inter alia Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance After 
Amsterdam’ (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/99. 
11  Paul Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (2012) 50(1) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 72, 73. 
12 This is not least reflected by Art 5(3) TEU, which henceforth refers also to the local 
and regional levels of government. 
13 Reimer von Borries and Malte Hauschild, ‘Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle’ 
(1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 369, 371-72. 
14 Ken Endo, ‘Subsidiarity and Its Enemies: To What Extent is Sovereignty Contested in 
the Mixed Commonwealth of Europe?’ (2001) EUI Working Paper RSC 2001/24, 24. 
15 Guiseppe Martinico, ‘Dating Cinderella: On Subsidiarity as a Political Safeguard of 
Federalism in the European Union’ (2011) European Public Law 652. 
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Article 5(3) TEU, ‘subsidiarity now penetrates below the Member State level, 
and requires examination of the regional issues’.16 This echoes the conclusion 
reached above: the current formulation of the principle can only be 
understood as an attempt to recognise polycentricity in EU law. Cygan argued 
that:  
 
Because the post-Lisbon version of Article 5 TEU 
explicitly refers to the legislative capacity of regional 
governance, this means that formal consideration of 
regional competences, together with the legislative 
capacity of regional institutions, is now an integral part of 
the legislative process. This ranges from the consideration 
of regional impact of a legislative proposal within the 
Commission’s Impact Assessments, to the ability of the 
CoR to seek judicial review of a legislative proposal for 
non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It is 
perhaps the ability of the CoR to engage in subsidiarity 
monitoring under Protocol 2 and alongside national 
parliaments which offers the most effective 
opportunities.17 
 
In examining whether subsidiarity manages to achieve these objectives just 
below, I find that despite its intention, subsidiarity remains incapable of 
doing so. The reason for this incapability is that the principle remains deeply 
anchored in the bi-centricity encountered elsewhere in the Treaties as well as 
the assumption that the various levels of public authority are self-contained. 
Subsidiarity reflects the bi-centricity inherent to the Treaties rather than the 
EU’s polycentric reality. This is so because Article 5(3) TEU establishes a two-
part, not a three-part test. It enquires whether the goals of the proposed 
action can be achieved by the Member States (either at central, regional or 
local level). If this is not found to be the case, it is for the EU to regulate. The 
provision does not ask whether (i) the objectives can be best achieved at 
subnational level, (ii) if not, at national level, and that if that is not so, then 
(iii) the case for supranational legislation is made. 18  Local and regional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘Autonomous Constitutional Regions in a Federal Europe’, in 
G De Baere E Cloots, S Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the European Union (Hart 2012) 238. 
17 Adam Cygan, ‘The Regions Within Multi-Level Governance: Enhanced Opportunity 
for Improved Accountability?’ (2014) 21(2) The Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 265, 268. 
18 This gives rise to a presumption that the Member State should in principle regulate 
unless there are compelling reasons for the EU to do so. As seen further below, this is 
not, however, how the principle operates in practice. On this see also Adam Cygan, ‘The 
Parliamentarisation of EU Decision-Making? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
National Parliaments’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 478, 481.  
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authorities are recognised to exist, but only in an indirect capacity as it is for 
the Member States to decide whether they should be classified as potential 
regulators - by the Member States, and not the EU.  
 
As per Article 5(3) TEU, either the national or the supranational is considered 
to be the appropriate scale of regulation. In the former scenario, it is for the 
State to decide whether to regulate in a centralised or a decentralised manner. 
This maintains the monolithic conception of statehood as from the 
perspective of EU law the Member State is the regulating instance. While the 
State may internally designate SNAs as regulators, EU law does not engage 
directly with their regulatory capacity. Article 5(3) TEU leaves it to the 
Member States to ‘decide according to their own constitution whether to 
apply the principle domestically as well’.19 From the supranational perspective 
it does not matter whether the Member State legislates at central, regional, or 
local level. Any regulatory measure originating within the Member State is 
considered to be that of the Member State. This sketches a division of public 
authority alongside two centres: the national and the supranational.  
 
Moreover, instead of recognising the inherent interconnection between 
various scales of public authority, subsidiarity takes their division for granted. 
The EU and its Member States are often understood as ‘two independent and 
autonomous spheres of power’,20 a fact echoed by the division of competence 
inherent to the Treaties, which recognises that States and the Union regulate, 
but not SNAs. It is, however, questionable whether such an assumption of 
division reflects reality in all cases as it is indeed well known that regional and 
local governments are often endowed with a law-making capacity. Subsidiarity 
nonetheless attempts to create the impression of a bi-centric division of 
public authority. As de Búrca has noted, Member States’ attempt to set clear 
competence boundaries in the Treaties ‘reflects a more fundamental wish to 
protect the integrity of the boundaries of the state polity.’21 The protection of 
boundaries stands very much at odds with the EU integrating the local and 
regional levels of government for it reinforces rather than weakens the 
dividing borders between them. What is more, by definition the protection of 
State boundaries mandates against any independent recognition of the 
subnational entities making up the Member State. The attachment to bi-
centricity and the denial of porosity are also evident in Protocol No 2 on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Reimer von Borries and Malte Hauschild, ‘Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle’ 
(1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 369, 374. 
20 Fernanda Nicola, ‘Invisible Cities in Europe’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1286. 
21 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Setting Constitutional Limits to EU Competence?’ Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa Francisco Lucas Pires Working Paper Series on 
European Constitutionalism Working Paper 2001/02, 12. 
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therein-enshrined Early Warning System.22 It will be seen that, just as Article 
5(3) TEU itself, the corresponding Protocol bears the promise of recognising 
polycentricity but cannot deliver that promise.  
 
III. PROTOCOL NO 2  
 
The new formulation of Article 5(3) TEU is not the sole innovation brought 
about by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to subsidiarity. There is also a revised 
version of Protocol No 2 that has been said to lead to a procedural thickening 
of the subsidiarity principle.23 Protocol No 2 refers, on a number of occasions, 
to the subnational levels of government. In the context of this essay this raises 
the question whether it is capable of recognising polycentricity and porosity. 
 
Article 2 of the Protocol provides that before proposing legislative acts, the 
Commission ‘shall consult widely. Such consultation shall, were appropriate, 
take into account the regional and local dimension of the action envisaged.’24 
This requirement mandates that the Commission consult a number of actors, 
including SNAs, in the context of its own legislative activity. SNAs are, 
however, solely recognised as actors EU legislation impacts upon - as subjects 
and implementers of EU law rather than autonomous regulators. The same 
conclusion emerges with regard to Article 5 of the Protocol, which establishes 
that EU directives must contain an assessment of ‘the rules to be put in place 
by Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation.’25 This 
requirement seeks to ascertain the impact of EU legislation on domestic 
authorities - in their implementing capacity - rather than in their role of 
autonomous regulators. The same provision further provides that EU draft 
legislative acts shall take account of financial and administrative burdens 
‘falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, 
economic operators and citizens, to be minimized and commensurate with 
the objective to be achieved.’ SNAs, just as the other actors referred to, are 
subject to EU law and the supranational legislative process should be sensitive 
towards the effects this will have on them.  
 
Article 5(3) TEU and Protocol No 2 accordingly recognise the existence of 
subnational authorities - however mainly as subjects and implementers of EU 
law rather than autonomous regulators. This would be possible even in 
absence of a reference to subnational authorities in Article 5(3) TEU. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality [2008] OJ C115/206 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Protocol No 2’). 
23  Sanja Bogojevíc and Xavier Groussot, ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of 
Federalism’, in Loic Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP 
2014), 234. 
24 Art 2 of Protocol No 2. 
25 Art 5 of Protocol No 2. 
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relationship between SNAs and the EU that is envisaged is indeed of a purely 
indirect nature and does not elevate SNAs to be recognised as autonomous 
levels of public authority in their own right. Whereas Article 5(3) TEU 
envisages the subnational dimension as a scale of public authority at which 
regulation is issued, Protocol No 2 focuses on their function as implementers 
of EU law. Local and regional authorities are portrayed as passive outsiders 
rather than active insiders to EU affairs. This echoes the conclusion reached 
above with regard to Article 5(3) TEU, namely that while subsidiarity on its 
face seems to move away from bi-centricity to create space for SNAs in EU 
law, this does not in fact appear to be the case as the latter continue to be 
recognised solely in an indirect as opposed to direct manner. The next section 
deals with the so-called Early Warning System; a new mechanism enshrined in 
Protocol No 2, which on its face bears a lot of promise for the recognition of 
polycentricity in EU law.  
 
IV. THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
Article 4 of Protocol No 2 obliges the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council to forward their draft legislative acts to national Parliaments. 
Article 6 of Protocol No 2 sets out the modalities of this procedure:  
 
Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national 
Parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of 
transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official 
languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a 
reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in 
question does not comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or each 
chamber of a national Parliament to consult, where 
appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers. 
 
This is commonly referred to as the ‘Early Warning System’ (‘EWS’), a ‘pre-
legislative constitutional intervention device’ 26  designed to give national 
Parliaments, which have lost power as a result of European integration, a say 
in the EU legislative process.27 In its current form, the EWS allows national 
parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion when they believe that an EU draft 
legislative act violates subsidiarity. If more than one third of national 
parliaments raise a reasoned opinion, the proposal must be reviewed. The 
initiating institution can, however, decide to maintain, amend, or withdraw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Cygan (n 17) 481. 
27 Philipp Kiiver, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, the National Parliaments and the Principle of 
Subsidiarity’ (2008) 15(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 77, 77. 
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the draft and must provide reasons for its decision.28 If the reasoned opinions 
represent at least half of all votes assigned to national Parliaments, the 
Commission must review the draft legislative act, and may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft. If it decides to maintain the draft, it must issue 
a reasoned opinion on the draft’s compliance with Article 5(3) TEU.29 The 
reasoned opinion is subsequently forwarded to the European Parliament and 
Council who have the final word on the matter. This mechanism gives force 
to Article 12 TEU, pursuant to which national parliaments contribute actively 
to the good functioning of the Union.30 
 
Article 6 of Protocol No 2’s reference to ‘national’ parliaments triggers the 
question whether, and if yes, to which extent, regional parliaments participate 
in the operation of the EWS. Regional parliaments are indeed just as likely as 
national parliaments to loose some of their decision-making abilities as a 
consequence of European integration, so that the rationale behind the EWS 
would also apply to them. It will be seen that five distinct avenues exist for 
SNAs to contribute to the EWS. Importantly, however, none of these 
avenues recognises SNAs as integral components of the polycentric EU.  
 
First, Article 6 of the Protocol provides that it is for each national parliament 
‘to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers.’ 
This reflects that European integration not only impacts on national, but also 
subnational political power. Subnational parliaments are, however, consulted 
trough the Member State, not directly by the EU, and States have discretion 
whether they wish to do so. Bi-centricity stands affirmed in this regard. 
Second, SNAs may participate in the EWS in those Member States with a 
bicameral parliamentary system in which one chamber is composed of 
regional representatives. In such a scenario this chamber has one of the two 
votes attributed to each national parliament in the context of the EWS. This 
is for instance the case of the German Bundesrat and the Austrian 
Bundesrat.31 The EWS allows regional parliaments to intervene in the EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Art 7(2) of the Protocol No 2. According to Art 6 of the Protocol, national 
parliaments have eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act to 
send a reasoned opinion. The threshold is ¼ in the case of a draft legislative act based on 
Art 76 TFEU. 
29 Art 7(3) of the Protocol No 2. 
30 The first yellow card was issued in 2012 as a consequence of a EU legislative proposal 
on the right to strike. See Federico Fabbrini and Katarzyna Granat, ‘'Yellow Card, But 
No Foul': The Role of the National Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the 
Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’ (2013) 50(1) Common 
Market Law Review 115. 
31 See also Josu Osés Abando, ‘Early Warning and Regional Parliaments: In Search of a New 
Model. Suggestions from the Basque Experience’ (2013) 5(2) Perspectives on Federalism 
74.  See also Philipp Kiiver, ‘The conduct of subsidiarity checks of EU legislative 
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decision-making and have their vote cast. However, from the perspective of 
EU law, they fall under the definition of ‘national’ parliament. They act on 
behalf of the State where this is provided for under domestic procedures. 
From the perspective of EU law, they however act as a Member State 
parliament rather than that of an SNA, affirming bicentricity rather than 
polycentricity. Third, regional parliaments can be considered to be national 
parliaments and accordingly directly participate in the EWM. Declaration 51, 
which only applies to one Member States, provides that:   
 
Belgium wishes to make clear that, in accordance with its 
constitutional law, not only the Chamber of 
Representatives and Senate of the Federal Parliament but 
also the parliamentary assemblies of the Communities and 
the Regions act, in terms of the competences exercised by 
the Union, as components of the national parliamentary 
system or chambers of the national Parliament. 
 
Belgium has created an avenue for its regional parliaments to be recognised as 
‘national parliaments’. This allows regional legislatures to directly intervene in 
the EWS without the need to pass through a secondary chamber at national 
level. Declaration 51 allows the involvement of regional parliaments not in 
their own capacity, but representing the Member State. They are ‘national’ 
parliaments from the perspective of EU law, reaffirming bicentricity. Fourth, 
a number of procedures within the respective Member States allow SNAs to 
transmit their concerns concerning EU draft legislative acts to the national 
parliament, which may then take them into account in its own reasoned 
opinion. Some of the Spanish regions’ statutes of autonomy for instance 
include provisions concerning participation in subsidiarity control.32 Abando 
noted that this has allowed the Basque chamber to make ‘specific 
contributions’ with regard to subsidiarity monitoring, but also noted that this 
mechanism ‘does not guarantee the taking into account of the contributions 
by the regional parliaments’.33  From of the perspective of EU law, such 
procedures are invisible, what the EWS sees is solely the final reasoned 
opinion submitted by the national Parliament. The former Commission 
President Barroso recognised in 2012 that the Commission ‘has no 
information as to the involvement of the respective regions in the elaboration 
and adoption of these opinions.’34  In 2011 already the Commissioner for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proposals by national parliaments: analysis, observations and practical recommendations’ 
(2012) 12(4) ERA Forum 535, 544. 
32 ibid, 78.  
33 ibid, 74. 
34 Question for written answer by MEP Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE) on the 
statistics on the early warning process, no. E-5865/2010, at 
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Interinstitutional Relations and Administration stated that ‘the Commission 
does not take account of the extent to which opinions of the regions are 
reflected in reports forwarded by the Member States.’ 35  This affirms bi-
centricity to the extent that from the perspective of EU law any opinion 
originating within the Member State is considered to be that of the Member 
State. 
 
Five distinct options exist that allow SNAs to indirectly contribute to the 
EWS, undoubtedly widening the participatory options SNAs have when it 
comes to EU affairs. This aspect of the subsidiarity mechanism, however, 
remains firmly attached to bi-centricity. It safeguards the monolithic nature 
of the Member State in assuming that any action originating within the State 
is that of the State. The analysis that has been undertaken confirms Cygan’s 
conclusion that Protocol 2 is a ‘state-centric process of subsidiarity review 
whose objective is to improve the accountability of, and inject democratic 
legitimacy into, what continues to be an equally state-centric legislative 
process.’36 While the EWS offers a number of options for SNAs to indirectly 
participate in subsidiarity review, it continues to reflect a bi-centric spirit. As 
such the revised version of subsidiarity, which henceforth also refers to local 
and regional authorities, does not significantly alter the state of affairs that 
predominated under the previous version thereof that solely referred to the 
Member States and the EU. However, SNAs may be involved in matters of 
subsidiarity monitoring only by virtue of provisions of domestic, rather than 
EU law. This was already possible under previous formulations of subsidiarity 
that did not involve any reference to SNAs. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has argued that the ability of the principle of subsidiarity, as 
enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU and Protocol No 2, to recognise subnational 
autonomies in EU law should be reconsidered. While on their face these 
provisions seem to directly recognise local and regional authorities as 
components of EU law, a second look reveals that this is not in fact the case. 
Even though Article 5(3) TEU was specifically amended to refer to local and 
regional autonomies, attempting to move away from the bi-centric spirit that 
otherwise characterises the European Treaties, this undertaking bears little 
promise of success. Despite the apparent intention, the provisions that have 
been examined do not provide any meaningful role for SNAs in subsidiarity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- //EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2010-
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35 Question for written answer E-009555/2011 on the Committee of the Regions and early 
warning system: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011- 009555+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
36 Cygan (n 17) 274. 
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control. Subsidiarity continues to apply only between the Member States and 
the EU, not SNAs - staying within the paradigm of bi-centricity rather than 
embracing polycentricity. Member States are free to implement the 
subsidiarity principle also on a domestic scale - extending it to local and 
regional authorities. This is not however mandated as a matter of EU law, 
where subsidiarity remains a two-part rather than a two-part test. It must thus 
be concluded that while subsidiarity seemed to bear the promise of 
recognising local and regional authorities as regulators in EU law, under its 
current formulation and implementation, Article 5(3) TEU limits this promise 
to pure rhetoric rather than actual substantive change. 
